Lic. Pedro Brieger

Professor, Belgrano University, Buenos Aires, Argentine

1. How Will the XXI Century Wars Be?

The clash of civilizations will dominate world policy in the next years, asserts the well-known Harvard professor Samuel Huntington. His article "The Clash of Civilizations" published in 1993 by the influential American magazine Foreign Affairs (Huntington, Samuel, "The Clash of Civilizations?", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 73, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49) is considered as the most important and polemic one in these days of the post Cold War. It's impact, mainly in governmental and academic strata is such, that it is compared to the success that the famous article of Francis Fukuyama "The end of History" had in it's time.

In the post Reagan era Fukuyama's theories are no longer in fashion, but nobody doubts that, in it's time, they caused anupheaval in the political world, in spite of their theoretical limitations and the despise with which they were received by the most important academic centres. Really, both works would probably have been restricted to the academic sphere if it were not for the fact that their authors exert a particular influence over the most important political strategists of the United States. Before an enigmatic XXI century, the interesting and polemic work of Huntington allow us to get into the new prevailing cosmovision, that will surely prevail, in some strategy designers of President's Bill Clinton administration.

2. What does Huntington Put Forth?

Taking as starting point the collapse of communism, the triumph of capitalism and the end of the Cold War, Huntington states as the main axis that future conflicts and wars will not break out as a consequence of ideological or economic confrontations. Contrary to what happened in the XX century, he believes that in the next one, international policy will be dominated by the interaction between the West and non western civilizations: "The West and the rest". Said interaction will cause a clash of civilizations and the return to traditional and tribal rivalries. In his novel analysis he supports the fact of the existence of eight great civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Indian, Slavic Orthodox, Latin American and African. How will this confrontation between the "West and the rest" be? Which will be the answer of non western civilizations to the power and values of the West? This seems to be Huntington's most important query.

As the cultural homogeneity of the West will prevent wars between western countries, confrontations will probably be between the West and the other civilizations. In order to stress his theory he quotes the Gulf War -the most important conflict since the fall of the Iron Curtain- since it was a clear confrontation of civilizations: the West against Islam.

Consequently with this reasoning, Huntington puts forth that it's no longer meaningful to group countries in terms of political systems or of economic development, nor is itconvenient to use categories of First World or Third World since "civilizations are the natural succesors to the three worlds of the Cold War. ( Huntington, Samuel, "If not Civilization, What?," in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 75, Nov/dec. 1993, p. 187)

On the contrary, he proposes to divide societies according to culture and civilization criteria, emphasizing those religions which have prevailed along time and which are nowadays a factor of conflicts between different people.

Why this "clash of civilizations"? Because the economic modernization and social change processes are separating people from their traditional identities, which will cause -as time goes by- the reaffirmation of these identities and the return to millenary sources. On the other hand, Huntington points out that the most important values of the West, such as individualism, liberalism, human rights, equality, freedom, democracy and free market, are the less important ones for the other cultures, those with which the West will enter into conflict. Such reaffirmation of identity in ethnic and religious terms would deepen the trend of building relations of the kind "we and they". His understanding of events in Russia is really particular.

Unlike most specialists, who consider that Yeltsin's problems come from the difficulty in carrying out the economic and political transition of a socialist society to a capitalist one, Huntington is convinced that Russia's problem lies in the fact that they want to form part of the West. But he warns that this relation with the West could become distant and conflicting should Russians reject liberal democracy and start behaving as "Russians".

Paradoxically, and in opposition to the importance the cultural aspect has for him, Huntington acknowledges that the West promotes its economic interests and imposes to the other nations those economic policies they consider adequate. The efforts of the West in order to promote their values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, in order to maintain their military predominance and advance their economic interests, cause contrary answers in other civilizations". He also recognizes that decisions taken in the most influential international agencies, as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, reflect the interests of the West even though they are presented as the wishes of the international community. It's not strange then for the other civilizations to sustain that the West has double guide-lines: they condemn and attack Iraq for their invasion to Kuwait but they are complacent with Israel and do not intervene when Moslems are massacred in Bosnia by Christians.

For the XXI century not to find a weakened western world, Huntington puts forth, that, in the first place, it must maintain its economic and military power. In order to avoid conflicts international institutions which reflect and legitimate the interests and values of the West must be strengthened; the military force of other states must be limited and military superiority in the East must be maintained. In short, a set ofvalues which will allow the West to protect their interests against the other civilizations.

3. The West is Superior

Even though many western thinkers and analysts do not agree with Huntington's forecasts regarding the characteristics of the forthcoming international conflicts, the great majority of them are convinced that the fall of the Iron Curtain as a symbolic representation, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union allow the elaboration of three axioms. First: the failure of communism and the following ideological and economic triumph of capitalism.

Second: all societies wish to copy the western model, and mainly the "American way of life". Third: that once communism and its principal practical representation -the Soviet Union- have disappeared, class struggle and social conflicts will be forgotten in history.

The categories used by Huntington are a consequence of the three already mentioned axioms, and their purpose is to impose new social definitions, even though some of them may look strange and others simply do appropriate the linguistic conventions of mass media which, really, cause definitions of a greater scientific precision to fade out. Even Jeane Kirpatrick, former advisor of George Bush, questions the parameters used by Huntington in order to mix civilizations. If civilization is defined by common objectives such as language, history, religion, customs and institutions and, subjectively, by identification, and if it is the broadest collectivity with which persons identify, why distinguish 'Latin America' from 'Western' Civilization? (...) And what is Russia if not western? The East/West designations of the Cold War made sense in a European context. Should a mere geographical definition be used, the African continent should also form part of the West, or at least great part of it. However, for Huntington, 'West' is a synonym of developed capitalist countries; basically North America and Europe.(Kirpatrick, Jeane, "The Modernizing imperative," in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.74, Sep/oct 1993, pp. 22-24)

Huntington's main thesis regarding interaction between the West and non western civilizations as a result of the end of the Cold War deprives of ideology many of the future conflicts and does not attach any importance to economic interests. However, the current interaction between the West and the 'rest' cannot erase the expeditions and conquests of colonial powers of the last 500 years, in Africa, America and Asia, since they are engraved in the collective recollection of the different civilizations which suffered the conquests. ( It's worthwhile to see different views from those expressed by Huntington in Mongin, Olivier; "Guerre des cultures ou modernisation avorte?", in Espirit, No. 76, Juin 1991; Muzaffar, Chandra, "The Clash of Civilizations or Camouflaging Dominance?" in Asian Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 71, July 1994;. Agbobli, Atsuts Kokouvi, "Eux et ous: Le monde noir-africain et le choc des civilisations" en Afrique 2000, No. 20, jan-mars 1995.)

Only in case ideologies should have lost importance and there were no economic interests, it would be possible to reach the conclusion that the conflict between civilizations cannot be avoided, because values are 'objectively' irreconcileable. And, as for Huntington the conflict cannot be avoided, he considers it "necessary for the West to maintain its economic and military power in order to protect its interests" explicitly acknowledging that interests are not merely cultural ones.

It's not new in the American way of thinking -even though it could also be attributed to the majority of developed countries which had once been colonial powers- to assert that the West is superior to the rest of civilizations. Henry Kissinger, says openly that they are "the only nation explicitly created for vindicating the idea of freedom. The United States always believed that their values were relevant for the rest of mankind.(That's the reason) for the impetus of a missionary duty for transforming the world according to our image." (Kissinger, Henry, in Clarin, Buenos Aires, 93. 1. 31, p. 19) This conception is not a patrimony of conservatives; Anthony Lake, Clinton's National Security Adviser, also openly acknowledges that "we must promote democracy and market economy in the world because this protects our interests and our security and reflects the values which are at the same time American and universal. Our leadership is sought and respected all over the world. Our ideal interests force us not only to go on board, but also to direct." ( Quoted by Decornoy, Jacques, "La chevauchee americaine pour la direction du monde", In Le Monde Diplomatique, nov, 1993, pp. 8-9.)

In spite of the differences and degrees, Huntington, Lake and Kissinger agree with respect to the superiority of western values, more especifically the American values. Said cosmovision, typically ethnocentric, consists in seeing all ethnical national groups through the prism of superiority of the own group -endowed of all possible qualities- before the intrinsic inferiority of the 'others'. For this reason Huntington points out that individualism, liberalism, human rights, equality, freedom, democracy and free market, the most important western values, are the less important ones for the rest of the world and have very little echo in Islamic, Confucian or Japanese cultures. In the western values scale, unlike eastern cultures, what prevails is the 'here and now.' Very rarely does the dominant western culture and western mass media make reference to the fact that the Chinese culture was for two thousand years the most advanced one; neither does it mention the golden era of Islam while in Europe the Inquisition was being prepared, just to mention some historic examples which allow us to understand why the 'others' vindicate a history of values superior to the western ones.

In order to prevent other civilizations from confronting the West, Huntington puts forth that they should adopt, in the first place, liberal democracy. He warns the Russians that if "they reject liberal democracy and start behaving as Russians, relations could turn distant and conflicting." However, can democracy be exported by means of the assistance, guidance and intervention of the United States or does this assistance also reflect other interests? On the other hand, do they always want to export it or only when it's convenient for Washington? Ambivalent attitudes with respect to Peru, Haiti, Somalia, Argelia, Turkey, Israel, Russia or China pose more questions thananswers.

4. Is the West Superior?

In the West there's a common belief that the other civilizations want to adopt the cultural, moral, social and economic guidelines of developed capitalist countries, especially as a synonym of development. "Do Africans really want development or do they prefer a traditional culture, not very rational and inefficient? -asks the wellknown liberal thinker Guy Sorman- Do they really want development and are they willing to clearly incorporate themselves to liberal capitalism and its laborious imperatives, as there's no other known way to prosperity?" ( Sorman, Guy, "Tercer Mundo: el desarrollo imposible", In La Naci An, Buenos Aires, 93. 1. 14, p. 9) Sorman does not believe that "colonization and the destruction of traditional cultures represent the cause of the historic misfortunes of the Third World." Instead, he does consider that the real responsibility of the West lies in the export of false ideas, socialism and Welfare State. Unlike Huntington, Sorman goes on using the expression 'Third World', as a synonym of backwardness, traditionalism and underdevelopment, in face of a highly technified 'First World.'

Really, it's not possible to qualify countries, people and civilizations using a mixture of cultural, social and economic guidelines. However, if for a time we would accept Huntington's arbitrary division of mankind, it's possible to assert that these civilizations, the Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Indian, Slavic Orthodox, Latin American and African, have built their cosmovision from their own historic-social development, using their own analysis categories. Also, from their own superiority before the rest of the civilizations, because the fact of being ethnocentric is not a western patrimony, it can be found in almost all people, cultures and religions. ( Rodinson, Maxime, "Algunas Ideas Simples Sobre el Antisemitismo," en Estudios Arabes, No. 72, apr-jun 1982, pp. 41-42)

For these civilizations, the West represents the systematic penetration and imposition of values, behaviours, institutions and identity; which urge them to be modern, to leave aside their traditional and comfortable clothes for the uncomfortable blue jeans, to eat hamburgers and to drink Coca Cola. For many people, especially rulers who look for the favours of the West, this can be an attractive and seductive model. If not, when Boris Yelstin visited the United States in 1989, after one day and a half, didn't he acknowledge that he had changed all his impressions on the United States and capitalism? But, even though it's difficult for western people to accept it, this model is far from seducing the majority of people with millenary traditions.

Within the framework of this paper it's not possible to analyse the past and present of each of the civilizations with which -according to Huntington- the West will clash. Anyway, it's interesting to know some opinions in order to understand the 'other' vision with respect to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the triumph of capitalism and the New International Orderdirected by the West.

In Japan there's a wide coincidence amongst political analysts with respect to the economic superiority of their country before the United States. The revival of political trends leaded by young, nationalist and impetuous politicians, is linked to the feeling of contempt that they have towards the United States -a nation evidently 'decadent'- which politically conditions them since 1945. Instead of imposing restrictive clauses in the trade exchange between both countries, and preventthe Japanese leadership in Southeast Asia, Noburu Hatakeyama, from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), thinks "that American industries should improve the level of their products and should not believe that hey are competitive for definition, since they are not." (Interview with Noburu Hatakeyama, published by the Journal of Japanese Trade & Industry, No. 72, 1992, pp. 43-49. )

But we must not believe that Japanese are interested only in economic competition. Their analysis of the New International Order usually incorporates elements from their millenary philosophy. Takeshi Umehara, one of the most prominent Japanese philosophers, is convinced that "the complete failure of Marxism is the event preceding the collapse of western liberalism. Far from being the feasible alternative in order to occupy the place of defeated Marxism and the prevailing ideology 'at the end of the story', liberalism will be the next domino piece to fall. Guided by Cartesian philosophy, the modern world is annihilating non human life and also menacing with killing human species." (Umehara, Takeshi, "Un mundo dominado por la disciplina de Oriente," Clar An, Buenos Aires, 92. 10. 17., p.14)

Umehara puts forth two old principles as Japan's post modern contribution to direct social life: mutualism or the ethics of interpersonal responsibility and generational responsibility born from the cyclical character of time. "This means that human society does not progress nor retroceds, in the place of looters during the brief episode of mortal splendour of man, the human being must be the custody of the continuity of life. During the last thirty years, The West created an abundant world based on the dominion of nature by the thinking human being. During much of said period, non western man was also subjected. But the abundance of the West is now menaced by the impossibility of nature of absorving the consequences of its looting and by the revival, especially in Asia, of prosperous and competitive non- westerners." (Ibid., p. 15)

Islam, which apparently has become the new enemy for the West, grows and develops as it's confrontation with the western world grows. Contrary to an idea spread by mass media, the most important Islamic referents do no oppose modernization or the import of technology coming from the West. ( See our latest book: Holy War or Political Struggle; Interviews and Debate over the Islamic Movements, (ed.) Biblos, Buenos Aires 1996.) Their objections appear when technological help implies economic and cultural submission.

Ali Shariati, one of the "modern" theorists of Islam, and once, wellknown opponent of the pro-western monarchy of the Shah Reza Pahlevi, provides the best explanation of Islam's vision in respect of West-East relations. "Why did the East loss its contacts with material and spiritual resources? Why cannot they recognize their power and make use of it? What does the West have that makes the East feel unfit? In order to reduce the people to its obedient bondage they must be deprived of their own personality, weakening them moral and espiritually, in such a way that never again do they feel themselves human. This kind of people will not complain when being used as cargo beasts. As soon as we are deprived of our personality, we shall feel ourselves inferior to the West and will consider ourselves less independent, noble and efficient than the West. We cannot solve it flattering and serving at the feet of the West, asking for their protection and cultural and industrial help, so that our society may have the new appearance of modernity. Only once we do have our own personality we could be independent from the Western dominance. (Shariati, Ali, Sociologa del Islam, Al Hoda, London, 1989, p. 213)

Even far away, from Moscow, Ievgueni Evtushenko, perhaps the most wellknown Russian poet, is afraid that McDonald's golden arches will become the monument of the post Cold War era and may replace the rainbow of cultures. Precisely, one of the factors that explains the size of the support given to Vladimir Shirinovsky in the Parliamentary elections of December 12th, 1993, is his strong opposition to the Russian cultural dissolution and to the abandonment of traditional values in behalf of Western culture and Coca-Cola. Two years before knowing the magnitude of the support to Shirinovsky, Evtushenko foreboded that "if our young and inexpert democracy cannot provide a better level of living the ghost of the past will be even more terrible when it comes back." (Evtushenko, Ievgueni, in El Cronista, Buenos Aires, 92. 3 29, p. 72)

There are practically no Russian intellectuals who praise the Soviet regime that lasted for seventy years, but this does not mean that they have become themselves apologists of capitalism. "It has been demonstrated that the previous URSS's system was not functional -asserts Nikolai Zitsev, Deputy Director of the Latin America Institute of the Academy of Sciences of Moscow-; I acknowledge the triumph of another ideology, but the western model, if we watch it in the periphery is very dangerous. Let us mention Brazil, for example, where a small strata of society has a standard of living similar to that of an European and the majority of people cannot eat." (Quoted in Clarin, 92. 1. 6, p. 19)

China, with a territory bigger than that of the United States, has already become the fourth biggest economy of the world; some economists foresee that in the year 2000 Hong Kong (in Chinese hands) will be like Tokyo, a great financial center. According to a detailed analysis of The Economist, if China continues with the accelerated rhythm of reforms and becomes an industrialized power and exporter of assets, the world will undergo a change similar to that of the industrial revolution. ("Powerless growth," in The Economist, 92. 8. 5, p. 34) How will the West react to this rapid growth? Will the Chinese oppose to the American attempt of imposing democracy in the Western style as they opposed to theintroduction of forced opium trade by the British in the XIX century?, wonders The Economist. "The Chinese, do not have plans to substitute the Chinese culture for the Western one, they insist that Chinese values are the essence and that the Western technology is useful for practical purposes." ("The Titan Stars," in The Economist, 93. 11. 27, p. 37)

This process, which seems inevitable, could be shook in its bases as the consequence of a succession war in the party dome, of the discontent of the population in the least favoured regions or of a reaction of the United States or Japan to prevent its impetuous growth, causing then a 'clash of civilizations'.


5. Can Economic Wars be Discarded in the XXI Century?

Unlike Huntington, who discards trade wars, even though he thinks that the West can and must impose their interests, other important analysts stress the fact that the XXI century wars may brake out as a consequence of the difficulties of the United States in becoming the first main economic power.

Lester Thurow, Dean of the Sloan Business School of Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT) believes that the main dilemma regarding the next century, as in the previous ones, is knowing who will dominate it. The United Kingdom dominated the XIX century, the United States the XX century, who will dominate the next one?, he wonders. "In 1945 there were two military superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, struggling for supremacy, and one economic superpower, the United States, who were by themselves. In 1992 there is one military superpower, the United States, who are by themselves, and three economic superpowers, that is to say, the United States, Japan and Europe, this latter one centred in Germany, who struggle in order to conquer the economic supremacy." (Thurow, Lester, La guerra del siglo XXI (Head to Head), (ed.) Vergara, Buenos Aires 1992, p. 17)

The main problem for the United States is their attempt to continue assuming their role of military superpower, which represents an obstacle in order to be once again the economic superpower. In order to restore their economic prosperity they need to reduce the defense budget, as Clinton has pointed out. But, if they do so, they run the risk of losing their leadership as first military power. Apparently a coul de sac. In other words, they cannot eternally play their role of interplanetary policeman -"Globocop" according to the term coined by Time magazine- and also restore their economic prosperity.

Researches analysing the difficulties of the United States in order to maintain their economic leadership and the deep social problems they have are innumerable. But it's worth mentioning some data provided by Lester Thurow: "In 1970, 64 of the world biggest industrial corporations were in the United States, 26 in Europe and only 8 in Japan. In 1988, only 42 were in the United States, 33 in Europe and 15 in Japan. In 1979, 19 out of the 50 most important banks were from the United States, in 1988 only 5. In 1990 among the top 20 there were no American banks. In thearea of Services, 9 out 10 most important companies are now Japanese." (Thurow, Lester, La guerra, op. cit., p. 34) As a supplement, and perhaps as the core in order to understand the forthcoming world, Thurow wonders which are the industries necessary to supply a standard of living of the XXI century category to the citizens of a nation. Taxatively, he points out that those who have microelectronic industries, biotechnology, new Industries based on the science of materials, telecommunications, civil aviation, robotics plus the machine tools and the computers plus the software will win. Not all will have these seven fundamental industries -he asserts- therefore some will win and others will lose.

Very few people seriously trust that - under these conditions - the United States will be the winners. Robert Bartley, the Wall Street Journal editor complains because "we have lost confidence in our capacity to design the new era. How do we recover that lost confidence if the United States have become the most indebted nation of the planet when ten years ago we were the most creditor one? Could it be achieved by means of military incursions of the kind of the Desert Storm against Iraq?" (Bartley, Robert, "The Case for Optimism," in Foreign Affairs, Sep/oct 1993, pp.15-18.) James Chace, Professor of International Relations of the New York Bard College, is convinced that "it's not very much probable for us to receive support for new adventures of this kind in the external field, and under no circumstances for us to act as the police of the world as the Pentagon would like to. Political relationships with developed capitalists countries which supported the United States during the Gulf War is of utmost importance. But, -Chance wonders- how will our allies react if in a paper produced by the Pentagon it says that our goal is to discourage them so that they do not dare to challenge our vanguardist position and to revert the economic and political established order. We do not know if the Japanese and the Germans are willing to offer thousand million dollars in order to support this policy ." ( Chace, James, "La ilusian del Pentagono de ser una Superpotencia," in La Naci An, Buenos Aires, 92. 4. 13, p. 19)

How does the two great opponents of the United States see the perspectives for the XXI century? The Japanese Shintaro Ishihara foresees that the military war between XX century superpowers will be replaced by the economic war of the XXI century, and it goes without saying that Japan will be the winner. (Ishihara, Shintaro, "El Japan que no puede decir que no: Porqu Japan sera elprimero entre los iguales. " Quoted by Umehara, Takeshi "Un mundo..."; p. 24) Helmut Kohl, the German Chancellor, is convinced that the 90's will be the decade of the Europeans and not of the Japanese. What is really interesting is that, implicitly, he considers that the United States are out of the game. For Lester Thurow, in the battle for the XXI century, Japan is the favourite.

None of the three powers is fully convinced of their triumph. Can this competition end without winners and losers? History, and specially that of this century, seems to assert the contrary. Discussions on the GATT agreements represent an example of the difficulties in order to reach an agreement regarding a New International Economic Order. In order to tilt the balance in their favour, the three powers will probably use all resourcesuntil defeating their opponents, and it's not crazy to say that for that purpose they could be forced to resort to the military via. If not, the two great world wars of this century were not caused for the opposition of interests and crisis within the most developed capitalists economies regardless of the cultural factor? The possibilities of confrontations for economic causes, as Huntington puts forth, have vanished or the XXI century wars will be caused by the resources still available, or for the new distribution of the world in areas of economic and political influence? During the Gulf Crisis the American Senator Robert Dole gave a kind of answer to this rhetoric question: "We are in the Gulf for three letters: OIL. We are not there to save democracy. Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, neither is Kuwait".

6. Towards a Global Confrontation?